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Being the boss at work and at home –
Self-employment and conflicts between partners

Stefan Schneck

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Institut für Mittelstandsforschung Bonn
Maximilianstr. 20, 53111 Bonn

Telefon +49/(0)228 / 72997 - 0
Telefax +49/(0)228 / 72997 - 34

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Being the boss at work and at home – Self-employment and conflicts between partners*

Stefan Schneck[†]

October 29, 2024

Abstract

We ask if the self-employed not only make professional decisions but also interfere in the private decisions of their partners. With German panel data, we show a positive relationship between complaints about interference and the self-employment status of partners, which indicates that the self-employed dominate in business and private life. Moreover, we show that partners exercising control over their partners are a major source of conflicts at home. This study is the first to suggest that decision autonomy in the work sphere is associated with dominance in private life, harming relationships.

JEL-Classification: D10, D19, L26

Keywords: procedural utility; procedural governance; self-employment; tensions

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[†]Corresponding author: IfM Bonn, Maximilianstrasse 20, 53111 Bonn, Germany, e-mail: schneck@ifm-bonn.org, Phone: +49 (0)2287299736.

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1 Introduction

Entrepreneurship is embedded into the family context (Aldrich and Cliff, 2003). For example, literature shows that the partner affects an individual decision to become an entrepreneur (Parker, 2008). Furthermore, partners provide social resources and support (e.g., Adler and Kwon, 2002; Werbel and Danes, 2010). Moreover, the partner is suggested to play a crucial role in business development (Brüderl and Preisendörfer, 1998; Werbel and Danes, 2010) and that role alignments between entrepreneurs and spouses have an impact on the dynamic progress of ventures (Mathias and Wang, 2023). Therefore, we explicitly consider that entrepreneurial actions cannot be isolated from household members (cf. Becker, 1965; Aldrich and Cliff, 2003; Chiappori and Mazzocco, 2017). In principle, the self-employed and the members of their households form one community with blurred boundaries between the business and the private sphere (Aldrich and Cliff, 2003; Carter et al., 2017).

One of the most important characteristics of self-employment is that the self-employed are their own bosses, and thus they are free to determine how activities and tasks are performed. In this regard, the literature suggests that the self-employed derive utility from their independence and the way outcomes are achieved (*procedural utility theory*, see Benz and Frey, 2004; Frey et al., 2004; Benz and Frey, 2008a,b; Fuchs-Schündeln, 2009; Lange, 2012; Schneck, 2014). In other words, the self-employed value their autonomy when determining how activities and tasks have to be performed in the business sphere (Benz and Frey, 2004; Frey et al., 2004). Given the family embeddedness of entrepreneurship, it is puzzling that we do not know whether the self-employed also exercise control at home. We, therefore, integrate procedural utility theory (Benz and Frey, 2004; Frey et al., 2004) into the family embeddedness perspective on entrepreneurship (Aldrich and Cliff, 2003) and suggest that the self-employed not only value their autonomy when determining how activities and tasks have to be performed in the job and hypothesize that this circumstance also exists in the relationship, thus leading the self-employed to take control over their partners by making them do things the way they want. We define the value individuals attach to determining

how partners have to do things as *procedural governance*. Specifically, individuals exercising control over their partners' decisions tend to be prone to procedural governance, which might have consequences for the quality of relationships. Lapierre and Allen (2012) and Falkenberg et al. (2020) analyzed the effects of the degree of individual control at home on work-family conflicts with data on employees and civil servants, and found that control at home reduces work interference with family. Conversely, this result suggests that individuals should report more tensions when the partners take control at home.

This study makes unique contributions to the extensive and interdisciplinary literature about work-family conflicts (e.g., Parasuraman and Simmers, 2001; Frone, 2003; Danes and Lee, 2004; Jennings and McDougald, 2007; Lapierre and Allen, 2012; König and Cesinger, 2015) by explicitly focusing on dyadic relationships (Yucel and Fan, 2019; Alshibani et al., 2023, 2024) and by considering the role of partners in dual-earner relationships. First, we examine whether having a self-employed partner leads to tensions in intimate relationships. Second, we investigate whether role models associated with the work sphere transfer to the private domain. Precisely, we address whether the preference for being the boss in the business sphere is associated with taking control over the partner in the private sphere. Third, we examine whether and how interference in partner's private affairs affects tensions in relationships. Fourth, we explore gender differences in the sensitivity to the degree of control at home and its impact on conflicts.

We use unique German panel data designed to study intimate relationships and family dynamics. Panel estimates consisting of more than 17,500 observations of 6,133 individuals in dual-earner relationships present evidence that respondents complain about tensions more frequently when their partners are self-employed. This effect can at least partly be attributed to the partners' interference in private affairs. In sum, our results suggest that procedural utility in the business sphere is likely accompanied by dominance in private life and adversely affects relationships. Moreover, interference in the partner's affairs is a source of disagreement, irrespective of gender. Males and females alike seem to be bothered by the

interference of partners. This paper provides evidence that it is imperative to recognize the role of partners in entrepreneurship research.

2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses

When considering the family embeddedness perspective (Aldrich and Cliff, 2003), the business and private sphere cannot be clearly separated. In this regard, the self-employed face specific job demands and duties. They work longer hours, on shorter notice, and experience a higher degree of job insecurity, strain, and exhaustion (Blanchflower, 2004; Annink et al., 2016), which might explain why self-employed individuals perceive a higher level of strain-based work-to-family conflict than paid employees (König and Cesinger, 2015). Moreover, Annink et al. (2016) suggest that the self-employed experience more work-to-family conflict than paid employees. In other words, the self-employment status of individuals has consequences for the quality of family and relationships.

Exhaustion, worries, and stress of the self-employed might also spill over into the private life and potentially affect other domains for this individual (Bolger et al., 1989; Westman, 2001; König and Cesinger, 2015). In addition to this spillover effect, Bolger et al. (1989) and Westman (2001) also considered crossover effects, where stress experienced in the work sphere affects the partner. Crossover effects thus are defined to be dyadic, relating to inter-individual effects. Empirical evidence of crossover effects is scarce and mainly focuses on the role of work-family conflict on family outcomes (cf. Burch, 2020, p. 595). These studies usually corroborate that a member's experiences of work-family conflict indeed affects other members of the household (Hammer et al., 2003, 2005). By consideration of crossover effects, we contribute to the emerging literature on the negative effects of self-employment on others (Miller, 2015; Shepherd, 2019). Specifically, we suggest that the self-employed person's partner must share the burdens associated with self-employment, which leads to tensions in the relationship. In this context, the self-employed are said to place greater focus on work than

on leisure (Blanchflower, 2004), which might explain why having a self-employed partner reduces satisfaction with leisure time (Stephan et al., 2023). Further recent literature confirms that entering self-employment affects the well-being of spouses negatively (Alshibani et al., 2024). For this reason, we hypothesize that having a self-employed partner is related to tensions in intimate relationships.

Hypothesis 1: Having a self-employed partner increases tensions in intimate relationships.

Entrepreneurial activity depends on individuals, suggesting that individual attributes and characteristics are influential (Shane et al., 2003). In fact, self-employed individuals have distinct characteristics that distinguish them from paid employees. For example, the self-employed prefer autonomy, defined as self-reliance, dominance, and independence (Hornaday and Aboud, 1971; Sexton and Bowman, 1985). Furthermore, self-employed individuals attach value to the way outcomes are achieved in the business sphere (Benz and Frey, 2004; Frey et al., 2004; Benz and Frey, 2008a,b; Fuchs-Schündeln, 2009; Lange, 2012; Schneck, 2014). Despite our knowledge about fluid boundaries between the business and the private sphere in households with self-employed individuals (Aldrich and Cliff, 2003; Carter et al., 2017), it is largely unclear whether and how procedural utility transfers into relationships. Since self-employment offers the flexibility to make autonomous decisions which leads to higher job satisfaction (e.g., Benz and Frey, 2004, 2008b), we surmise that individual well-being might be influenced by the ability to make decisions in the private sphere. We, therefore, introduce procedural governance, which describes the value individuals attach to determining how partners have to do things in the private sphere. Hence, individuals exercising control over their partners' decisions tend to be prone to procedural governance, while those who allow their partners to choose how they do things are not.

Lapierre and Allen (2012) explain that the level of control at work is possibly uncorrelated with the amount of control individuals have at home. So far, however, studies were not

responsive to the role of self-employment (Lapierre and Allen, 2012; Falkenberg et al., 2020). In this regard, Miller (2015, p. 3) noted that "the need for control and dominance, which is intrinsic to some entrepreneurs [...], can ultimately devolve into behaviors such as an obsessive wish to control the details of a business." Moreover, Kets de Vries (1985) suggests that it is not uncommon that self-employed individuals are unwilling to submit to authority. Since the business and the private spheres cannot be considered separately, one might speculate that self-employed individuals take control over their partners and also make decisions for them. In other words, self-employed individuals do not only determine how activities and tasks have to be performed at work but tend to exercise control over their partners' decisions in the private sphere as well. They are thus expected to be prone to procedural governance.

Individuals with control at home are free to decide about home-related goals and responsibilities, have leeway in carrying out tasks, and decide on their own when the tasks have to be performed. Comparing self-determined individuals with others merely under control reveals that the former have higher self-esteem and general well-being than the latter (cf. self-determination theory, Ryan and Deci, 2000; Ryan et al., 2015). Consistent with these findings, Griffin et al. (2003) showed that individuals with lower control at home had a higher risk of developing depression and anxiety. Moreover, Ryan et al. (2015) suggest that autonomy support is a crucial factor for the quality of relationships. Lapierre and Allen (2012) found that higher levels of control at home reduce work interference with family. In this line, Falkenberg et al. (2020) showed that less control at home increased risks for work-family interference. Accordingly, partners being prone to procedural governance limit the spouse's leeway to decide at home, which might then increase tensions.

Hypothesis 2: Proneness to procedural governance is associated with crossover effects and increases tensions in intimate relationships.

Shane et al. (2003) propose that individual attributes and characteristics affect the en-

tire entrepreneurial process and literature corroborates that self-employed individuals have a preference for dominance (Sexton and Bowman, 1985; Miller, 2015), which is to some extent innate (Shane, 2010). Therefore, we propose that crossover effects that may arise from having a self-employed partner might not only be due to the partner’s job experiences – the individual characteristics of the self-employed partner also matter. Suppose a partner is (innately) dominant and therefore has a taste for being the boss at work and home. It thus can be expected that this person opts for self-employment and will take control over their partners in the private sphere. We, therefore, propose that personal traits can predict the choice of self-employment and affect the level of disagreement and quarreling between partners. In this context, conflicts in relationships might not only be due to the partner’s self-employment and related job demands but also due to procedural governance. Consequently, without consideration of procedural governance, one might at least partially incorrectly contribute potential adverse effects of self-employment on intimate relationships to the job demands instead of the individual characteristics of the self-employed. We thus ask whether individual dominance, as indicated by procedural governance, at least partly explains the relation between self-employment status and tensions in intimate relationships.

Hypothesis 3: The relation between tensions in intimate relationships and having a self-employed partner is explained by the partner’s proneness to procedural governance.

Lange (2012) showed that males and females alike value their independence in the business sphere and benefit from procedural utility. However, societies ascribe certain domestic roles to women (Welter et al., 2019), which might lead to differences in the level of control at home and also have impact on procedural governance. For example, in patriarchal/matriarchal societies, men/women are in control of the business and the household sphere. However, in an egalitarian society where men and women are considered as equals, the level of control in the business sphere and at home might be uncorrelated with gender-specific roles.

Gender attained substantial attention in research about the relationship between family and work (among others, Parasuraman and Simmers, 2001; Jennings and McDougald, 2007; Falkenberg et al., 2020) and also in entrepreneurship research (Welter et al., 2019). Alshibani et al. (2024) consider that the effect of spouses entering self-employment on well-being might be gender-specific and attribute this to gender-specific roles and attitudes. Here, we combine household-related roles, self-employment, and gender by addressing gender-related differences in how procedural utility and self-employment status of the partner relate to tensions in intimate relationships. So far, the relationship between control at home, socioeconomic status, and gender has only been systematically examined by Griffin et al. (2003) and Falkenberg et al. (2020) with data consisting of civil servants and socioeconomic status defined by civil service grade title. Griffin et al. (2003, p. 321) "found women in the lowest grade and men in the middle and highest grades to have the highest odds for anxiety disorders if they reported low control at home". These results suggest that females suffer the most from an environment with low control at home and low socioeconomic status. Males, in turn, suffer more likely if they are in high positions at work, but have low control at home. Males, therefore, might be tempted to combine high status at work and control at home. In our case, we assume that self-employment entails high status because the self-employed are the managers of their own businesses. For that reason, we propose that males are more prone to procedural governance when being self-employed. This in turn has consequences for the female partners, who then have little control at home, which can ultimately also lead to tensions at home.

Falkenberg et al. (2020) presented evidence that males with high and intermediate socioeconomic status report more tensions at home especially if their control at home is low. However, the authors did not address whether the partner or the respondent is responsible for the quarrel. For this reason, males might report more tensions because their partners are prone to procedural governance. Women, in turn, suffer when they have a low socioeconomic status and are exposed to a partner who is prone to procedural governance, leading

to low control at home (Griffin et al., 2003). Quarrel, therefore, can be triggered by partners taking control at home. This reasoning shows the importance of considering the partner’s characteristics when analyzing quarrels in intimate relationships. Due to the lack of clear-cut implications about the partner’s role in empirical studies, we formulate an exploratory hypothesis.

Hypothesis 4: There are gender differences in the sensitivity of how procedural governance and self-employment status of the partner relate to tensions in intimate relationships.

3 Data

3.1 Data set

The empirical analysis is based on the Panel Analysis of Intimate Relationships and Family Dynamics, also called The German Family Panel (*pairfam*). This annual survey consists of a multitude of information about couple and partnership dynamics. The panel study started in 2008/2009 with more than 12,000 randomly selected participants, consisting of roughly 4,000 so-called ”anchor persons” of the following birth cohorts: 1971-1973, 1981-1983, and 1991-1993. The target population of *pairfam* includes the universe of German-speaking individuals living in private households in Germany who belong to one of the mentioned birth cohorts (Huinink et al., 2011; Brüderl et al., 2022c). New anchors of the birth cohort 2001-2003 as well as a refreshment sample were added in wave 11 (2018/19). This study relies on the data set covering waves 1 (2008/2009) to 13 (2020/2021), data file version 13.0.0 (doi.org/10.4232/pairfam.5678.13.0.0). Specific details about the concepts, design, and survey methods of the *pairfam* are presented in Brüderl et al. (2022a), Brüderl et al. (2022c) and Huinink et al. (2011).

The most distinctive feature of the panel is that anchors are asked for consent for the participation of their intimate partner. For example, in wave 13, almost 3,000 of 4,769 anchor respondents with partners at the time of interview consented to the partner survey (Brüderl et al., 2022c). Four in five of these partners completed their questionnaire, leading to a coverage rate of 50% for existing partners in the latest available wave (Brüderl et al., 2022c). The responses of partners are stored in the so-called partner data set, while the responses of anchors are stored in the so-called anchor data set. Thus, the data consist of anchor- and partner data sets to separate the responses from the members of a relationship. However, we generated a panel data set where both the anchor and the partner were considered and treated as different actors. Technically, we appended the anchor and partner data sets. We thus consider the responses of both partners within relationships, which we refer to as the respondents.¹

The survey permits dyadic analysis by linking respondents to their partners and contains questions about perceptions, quarrels, labor market status, sociodemographics, education, household composition and income enabling the analysis of self-employment and tensions in relationships, with a rich set of control variables. The set of considered control variables includes the logarithm of individual net income and net household income², the relative contribution of a respondent to household income³, age (in years, including the squared

¹The random selection of anchor respondents implies that this group of individuals does not only include heads of households. Note that pairfam also includes design weights correcting for disproportionate sampling across cohorts and the combination of multiple selection frames (Brüderl et al., 2022b). These weights refer to the different cohort inclusion probabilities, the shares of respondents living in Eastern and Western Germany, and address issues arising from the addition of refreshment samples. In the following empirical analysis, we control for age (as a proxy for cohort), wave, and federal state to address issues related to potential over- and undersampling. Weights are not applied because weighting factors are only available for the anchor person, but not for the partner. Moreover, the weighting scheme is not responsive to the population of couples or partners.

²Individuals who did not report their income but were surveyed to achieve an income within a particular interval were coded the midpoint of the respective interval. The same applies to household income (see Brüderl et al., 2022b, pp. 49ff). Here, we follow Sorgner et al. (2017) and Pischke (2007, p. 1227), who argue that a large number of income intervals makes it "unlikely to introduce much more measurement error than is done by respondents' rounding continuous amounts". Since wave two, individual and household net income were categorized into 14 income categories, which constitutes a sufficient amount of income intervals. In our final sample of 17,778 observations, we imputed 7.76% of individual and 9.75% of household incomes.

³In fact, we divide the individual net income by the net household income. In some cases, the relative individual net income exceeds 100 percent. In these cases we trim these values to be equal to 1.

term), a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is male, and dummy variables indicating migration background (no, 1st generation, 2nd generation), education following the CASMIN scheme⁴, duration of current relationship (in months), marital status (never married, married/civil union, divorced/dissolved civil union, widowed/surviving partner in a civil union), the number of number of children living the in household (main residence), a dummy variable indicating that at least one person is younger than 14 years and living in main residence, dummy variables for each of the 16 federal states, and dummy variables for each considered survey wave. The final analysis covers panel waves 2 to 13 (2009/10 to 2020/21). Litsardopoulos and Saridakis (2022) found positive effects on harmony when both partners were self-employed. For this reason, we also include a dummy variable indicating that both partners are self-employed. In total, more than 400 observations correspond to two self-employed partners. However, only a small fraction reported to be copreneurs. In fact, less than 10% of these own the same business.

The data set applied in this study is restricted to relationships where both partners are either full-time employed or self-employed. Moreover, respondents are only included if they are aged between 18 and 65.⁵ Note that we do not necessarily consider both partners in the final sample due to missing information. Still, we include the respondents with all the required information who match the inclusion criteria. The final sample consists of more than 17,000 responses from 6,133 respondents. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table A.1 in the appendix.

3.2 Central variables

Procedural governance is identified via the question "How often does your current partner make you do things his/her way?".⁶ This question was included in all waves and answered

⁴See Brüderl et al. (2022b, p. 46).

⁵If one of the partners does not meet the age restrictions, we exclude both partners from our sample.

⁶Note that prior studies examined control at home as a construct consisting of many variables (Lapierre and Allen, 2012) or as a single variable (Falkenberg et al., 2020). This study differs from existing ones by using a single variable enabling the examination of the role of partners.

using a 5-item Likert scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (always). The employment status of individuals is identified via the pairfam generated variables "current primary activity status of anchor (casprim)" and "current primary activity status of partner (pcasprim)" (see Brüderl et al., 2022b, pp. 51f). The possibility to link partners allowed us to generate two dummy variables of main interest: 1) self-employment of respondent (yes/no), 2) self-employment of partner (yes/no). As we focus on dual-earner couples, the reference group to the self-employed consists of full-time paid employees. Tensions in relationships are measured by the frequency of disagreements and quarrels. The original question is "How often do you and [name current partner (hpn)] disagree and quarrel?", which is based on a 5-item Likert scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (always) and was included in all survey waves.

Pairwise correlation coefficients show that disagreement and quarreling are not significantly correlated with the respondent's self-employment status (see Table 1). Having a self-employed partner, in turn, increases complaints about tensions. Procedural governance increases tensions as well. Moreover, having a self-employed partner and proneness to procedural governance are positively and significantly correlated, which implies that self-employed partners are associated with a higher degree of interference in respondents' decisions.

Insert Table 1 about here

3.3 Methods

The panel structure of the pairfam offers the possibility to consider the development of individual behavior as well as complaints about tensions over time and to account for individual heterogeneity. We therefore apply panel regression methods. In our case, we must be aware of personal traits that can affect the level of disagreement and quarreling between partners and also predict the choice of self-employment. For example, consider a person who cannot tolerate having a boss and/or has a non-harmonious personality, who quarrels in their job and in all their relationships. This person would likely also be self-employed. It is possible to deal with such time-invariant, potentially innate characteristics by consideration of

individual fixed effects. However, fixed-effects regression is responsive to status changes in variables and not to the actual household situation.

In our case, we need to control for unobserved heterogeneity, but we are not purely interested in analyzing status changes. We, therefore, follow Litsardopoulos and Saridakis (2022) and employ a hybrid regression model splitting the effects of cluster-varying covariates on the outcome variable into within-cluster and between-cluster effects (Schunck, 2013; Schunck and Perales, 2017). Such a hybrid model allows the separation of individual fixed-effects, while preserving valuable information for the between-effects. This feature enables an examination of the effect of a change in the employment status, which would be extracted in the case of pure fixed-effects regression, and the average effect of the employment status. Equation (1) describes the hybrid linear model, where tensions reported by individual i at time t are explained by different effects. The model reports the coefficients based on the within-cluster effect of cluster-varying variables on the outcome (β_1). β_2 refers to the coefficients based on the between estimator and β_3 addresses the effects of time invariant explanatory variables. This approach is a "good solution to obtain proximate fixed-effects estimates" (Schunck and Perales, 2017, p. 112) in situations where unobserved heterogeneity needs to be accounted for and where fixed-effects regression is not feasible, such as in the ordered probit case. We therefore apply a hybrid ordered probit model specifying an ordinal distribution of the outcome variable and the link function probit.⁷ Standard errors are clustered at the individual level to account for the dependence of observations within persons (Cameron and Miller, 2015).

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * (x_{it} - \bar{x}_i) + \beta_2 * \bar{x}_i + \beta_3 * z_i + u_i + e_{ij} \quad (1)$$

The between-cluster effects represent the effects of the current self-employment status of respondent and partner. The within-cluster effects, in turn, refer to the individuals that move from paid employment into self-employment.

⁷In Stata (SE–Standard Edition, version 17.0), we specify the model by using the command *xthybrid* with options *clusterid(ID) family(ordinal) link(probit)*.

To test hypothesis 1, we estimate a baseline model that includes the dummy variable for the partner’s self-employment status and the comprehensive set of control variables (cf. baseline model, equation Baseline model "B"). A significantly positive between-cluster coefficient leads to the conclusion that having a self-employed partner leads more frequently to tensions than having a partner in an employer-employee relationship.

$$Y_{it} = \alpha^B \text{partner is self-employed}_{it} + \gamma^B X_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (\text{Baseline model "B"})$$

To check the role of procedural governance in conflicts between partners, we additionally include the degree of interference of the partner into our model, which is measured by the question "How often does your current partner make you do things his/her way" as additional variable of interest (see the extended model, equation Extended model "E"). As noted above, we expect that a higher degree of interference from the partner limits the respondent’s leeway and therefore leads to more tensions (hypothesis 2). This specification also allows to conclude about the effect of procedural governance in conflicts between partners (hypothesis 3). Comparison of estimates from nonlinear models, such as the ordered probit model, with different functional forms is not straightforward due to the rescaling problem (Kohler et al., 2011; Karlson et al., 2012; Schunck and Perales, 2017). We therefore look at changes in the significance levels of already existing variables in nested models (also see Benz and Frey, 2004, 2008a; Lange, 2012; Schneck, 2014; Schunck and Perales, 2017). Suppose the between-cluster effect of having a self-employed partner is significant in the baseline model and becomes insignificant in the extended model.⁸ In that case, procedural governance explains the tensions that we would otherwise attribute to the self-employment status of the partner. Such results support hypothesis 3.

$$Y_{it} = \alpha^E \text{partner is self-employed}_{it} + \beta^E \text{procedural governance}_{it} + \gamma^E X_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (\text{Extended model "E"})$$

⁸Technically, α^B is statistically significant and α^E is insignificant.

We examine hypothesis 4 by estimating separate models for males and females and by estimating models with interaction terms containing the interaction between being a male respondent and having a self-employed partner. In addition, we also include interaction terms referring to the effects of being a male respondent and the proneness to procedural governance of the partner. This provides us with gender-specific insights about the effects of procedural governance and self-employment of partners and their relation to tensions. Significant interaction effects indicate gender-specific differences.

4 Results

4.1 Procedural governance and self-employment

We argued that the self-employed are more prone to procedural governance than paid employees. We therefore start by examining whether the self-employed are more likely to interfere in partner's issues than paid employees. Around 20% of respondents report having the leeway to decide how to do things. They can be said to live in a very tranquil relationship, where partners rarely or never interfere (Table 2). In turn, about 25% of respondents report a constricted relationship because their partner interferes at least often. Partners of self-employed individuals report more frequently that their partners decide how things should be done. Around 30% of the respondents report that self-employed partners interfere often or always. In comparison, roughly 25% of respondents with full-time employed partners complain about such dominant partners. In combination with the presented correlation analysis (cf. Table 1), the results suggest that having a partner prone to procedural governance and the partner's self-employment status seem to be associated.

Insert Table 2 about here

Next, we apply hybrid ordered probit regression to investigate the relationship between self-employment and procedural governance. The within-cluster (fixed) effects represent the

effects of changes in variables. The between-cluster (random) effects present the effects of the respondent's and partner's employment status on tensions. Table 3, column (1) presents statistically insignificant within-cluster effects for the variables of main interest. Respondents, therefore, do not report that their partners become more or less dominant if the respondent or the partner becomes self-employed. Column (4), however, reveals a significantly positive between-cluster effect of having a self-employed partner even when controlling for a magnitude of individual and household characteristics. Hence, respondents are more likely to report dominant partners if their partner is self-employed. This result can be interpreted as evidence that procedural governance is especially likely among the self-employed or that the self-employed are more prone to procedural governance than paid employees. In other words, the self-employed do not only decide in the business sphere but also decide how to do things for their partners in their private lives.

Insert Table 3 about here

Columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) of Table 2 present the gendered effects of having a self-employed partner on partner's proneness to procedural governance. Again, no significant within-cluster effect was estimated. With respect to between-cluster effects, specification (3) reveals that females with self-employed partners are significantly more likely to report that their partners take control and are thus subject to procedural governance. For males, the between-cluster effects are also positive and indicative of a similar relationship. However, the effect is statistically insignificant. We therefore conclude that the severity of procedural governance differs by gender when a self-employed partner is present. To conclude, male self-employed individuals tend to be more prone to procedural governance than their female counterparts.

4.2 The role of self-employment and procedural governance in conflicts between partners

In this section, we address the relationship between self-employment, procedural governance, and tensions between partners with a special focus on crossover effects. The estimation results of the baseline and the extended models are presented in Figure 1, which refers to the between-cluster effects of the hybrid ordered probit model. The focus on the between-cluster effects is due to the formulation of our hypotheses, which refer to the self-employment status rather than to individuals becoming self-employed. Litsardopoulos and Saridakis (2022) considered the possibility that both partners might be self-employed. For this reason, we included this variable in an additional model and estimated the baseline and the extended models as well.

The results presented in Figure 1 indicate that the respondent’s self-employment status is significantly correlated with tensions in partnerships. In fact, the negative effect implies that being self-employed reduces the reported frequency of disagreement and quarreling significantly. This result contradicts some of the existing findings that were not explicitly responsive to the role of the partners and their respective employment status (e.g., Annink et al., 2016). Next, we concentrate on the crossover effects and discuss the results with reference to hypothesis 1. Having a self-employed partner has a significant and positive impact on tensions in the baseline model, which indicates that disagreements and quarreling are more likely to be reported when the partner is self-employed. Hence, negative crossover effects are evident and hypothesis 1 is corroborated. In fact, the results suggest that the primary source of tensions within relationships is not the own but the partner’s employment status.⁹

Hypothesis 2 is addressed in the extended model. There is a significant relationship

⁹The estimated within-cluster effects suggest that there is no significant effect associated with the partner or the respondent becoming self-employed on the reported level of tensions (Table S.3 in the Supplementary Material).

between procedural governance and tensions reported by the respondent.¹⁰ The between-cluster effects are highly significant and increase with the level of the partner's proneness to procedural governance. Furthermore, also the within-cluster effects (presented in Table S.3 in the Supplementary material) suggest that changes to higher levels of procedural governance increase tensions. Hence, if the partner becomes more prone to procedural governance and the more frequently partners interfere in respondents' issues, the higher the frequency of disagreement and quarreling reported by the respondent. This is clear evidence in favor of hypothesis 2: There is a negative crossover effect of proneness to procedural governance on the partner.

Insert Figure 1 about here

Finally, we test hypothesis 3 by comparing the estimated between-cluster effects of the partner's self-employment status across baseline and extended models. When compared to the baseline specification, the coefficient for partner's self-employment status becomes less significant in the extended model when the interaction term indicating that both partners are self-employed is not included. In fact, the corresponding p-value increases from 0.008 to 0.057. When also accounting for two self-employed partners, then the effect of having a self-employed partner is significant without controlling for procedural governance (Coef.: 0.138, p-value: 0.086), but becomes insignificant when accounting for procedural governance (Coef.: 0.091, p-value: 0.246). Procedural governance is thus found to explain tensions caused by a self-employed partner. Specifically, the crossover effect of procedural governance dominates the negative crossover effect of having a self-employed partner on the partner's level of quarrel. The results thus are indicative that procedural governance is more likely to be associated with tensions at home than having a self-employed partner, which is consistent with hypothesis 3.

¹⁰The "+" in Figure 1 implies that higher levels of partner's proneness to procedural governance are associated with higher levels of tensions. We included four dummy variables into our specifications so that potential nonlinear effects are captured (cf. Table S.3 in the Supplementary Material). We abstained from presentation of the coefficients for ease of interpretation.

Inspection of the Akaike and the Bayesian Information Criteria (cf. Table S.3 in the Supplementary Material) suggests that the extended model provides a better fit than the baseline model. The goodness of fit is thus affected by procedural governance, which lends further credit to corroborating hypotheses 2 and 3. In fact, proneness to procedural governance, rather than having a self-employed partner, is the primary source of tensions in relationships.

So far, the variable on employment status did not restrict the sample to the full-time self-employed. We conducted a robustness check by examining a sample of relationships where both partners were working at least 36 hours per week.¹¹ The results do not corroborate hypothesis 1: Although the effect of having a self-employed partner increases the frequency of quarrel, the estimated effect is not statistically significant. Hypotheses 2 is corroborated. A partner who is prone to procedural governance is a major source of tensions in relationships. Without significant crossover effect of having a self-employed partner in the baseline model, hypothesis 3 cannot be supported.

4.3 Sensitivity of effects by gender

So far, we are not informed about whether and how employment status and procedural governance affect perceptions about tensions by gender. Descriptive statistics show that respondents complain about higher levels of procedural governance if their partner is self-employed (see Table 2). This also holds when looking at gendered effects (Table 4). Based on the presented descriptive statistics, we can reasonably infer that self-employed partners are more likely to be prone to procedural governance. Moreover, male respondents, in general, tend to report higher levels of proneness to procedural governance of their partners than female respondents. Males are thus more sensitive to interference in their own issues.

¹¹Due to the utilized original variables provided by pairfam, the sample is restricted to full-time employees and all self-employed individuals. The aim of this robustness check is to compare only individuals who work full-time in paid employment and self-employment. The number of observations and considered individuals dropped to 13,232.

Insert Table 4 about here

When estimating the models separately for male and female respondents, we find that hypothesis 1 is only corroborated in the baseline models without consideration of the case that both partners are self-employed. When accounting for cases where respondent and partner are self-employed, the effect is insignificant. Hypothesis 2 is clearly corroborated for males as well as females (see Figure 2). This implies that having a partner prone to procedural governance increases tensions in intimate relationships, irrespective of gender. Hypothesis 3 is supported when not accounting for two self-employed partners. In general, the basic patterns regarding our hypotheses do not differ by gender. However, some gender-related differences are evident. The within-cluster effects indicate that a partner, who becomes self-employed, increases tensions among male respondents (see Table S.4 in the Supplementary Material). Such a crossover effect is not evident when considering female respondents. Moreover, according to the effects of respondent's self-employment status shown in Figure 2, self-employed females face significantly less tensions in relationships, but males do not.

Insert Figure 2 about here

We also tested hypothesis 4 by examining the significance of gendered interaction terms in our hybrid model.¹² The results reveal highly significant and positive within-cluster crossover effects of a self-employed partner, which implies that males are more frequently quarreling when their partners become self-employed (see Table S.5 in the Supplementary Material). According to the between-cluster effects, the interaction term is insignificant, which implies that there are no gender-specific effects when the partner is self-employed. Procedural governance, again, is associated with a higher degree of tensions because either the within- and the between-cluster effects are highly significant and suggest that higher degrees of procedural governance are associated with a higher frequency of quarreling. However, there is

¹²See Schunck (2013) for a discussion regarding pitfalls to the application of hybrid linear models when including interaction terms. In the context of nonlinear models, as applied here, we only concentrate on examining the significance of the estimated interaction terms and do not compare marginal effects.

no gendered effect because the interaction terms associated with procedural governance are statistically insignificant throughout the specifications. This result is interpreted as evidence that proneness to procedural governance is associated with crossover effects causing tensions in relationships, irrespective of gender.

5 Discussion and Conclusion

Considering that the self-employed derive utility not only from achievements but also attach value to the way outcomes are achieved (Benz and Frey, 2004, 2008a,b; Fuchs-Schündeln, 2009), we suggest that procedural utility in the business sphere can also be observed in the private sphere. In fact, we hypothesize that the self-employed not only decide on business issues but also interfere in their partner's private issues, which we define as procedural governance. So far, interference in a partner's issues is believed to potentially occur in any relationship where there is a lack of respect for boundaries and autonomy, without relation to any particular occupation. Our analysis of German panel data comprising more than 17,000 observations of 6,133 individuals in dual-earner relationships suggests that the self-employed are more likely to interfere in partners' issues, predominantly due to the male self-employed. Hence, the results provide evidence for an association between self-employment and governance in private life.

Following the literature suggesting that the degree of individual autonomy affects the quality of relationships (Ryan et al., 2015), we relate procedural governance to tensions in intimate relationships. Furthermore, we follow the recent literature about potential negative effects of self-employment on others (Miller, 2015; Shepherd, 2019) and examine the influence of having a self-employed partner on the frequency of disagreement and quarreling. Our results are manifold: 1) Perceptions about tensions in relationships are negatively correlated with own employment status. 2) Having a self-employed partner is positively correlated with the frequency of disagreements and quarrels in relationships. It is thus not the own

but the partner's self-employment that matters when it comes to conflicts. 3) The frequency of conflicts increases with the frequency of interference by the partner. 4) The significant effect of the partner's self-employment decreases when procedural governance of partners is accounted for. Analogous to Miller (2015, p. 3), who noted that "the need for control and dominance [...] is intrinsic to some entrepreneurs", the results suggest that tensions can (at least partly) be attributed to procedural governance and individual characteristics of the partner rather than to self-employment. In other words, individuals might accept having a self-employed partner with certain job-related requirements but are not inclined to deal with procedural governance. In sum, the self-employed seem to cause tensions by making partners do things the way they want and thus benefit from deciding how to achieve goals - in business as well as in private life. Finally, we examine gendered effects and provide evidence that having a partner prone to procedural governance is a source of tensions, irrespective of gender.

The role of the partner is of crucial interest when it comes to the formation of decisions, attitudes, and conflicts (Aldrich and Cliff, 2003; Parker, 2008; Yucel and Fan, 2019; Serra-Garcia, 2022). With respect to self-employment, this paper shows that having a self-employed partner might have adverse crossover effects on the quality of relationships. Hence, future studies might engage in examining the reasons why having a self-employed partner correlates negatively with the quality of relationships. One reason might be the job-specific duties, such as long working hours, working on short notice, strain, and exhaustion (Blanchflower, 2004; Annink et al., 2016), which might be buffered by social resources provided by partners (Adler and Kwon, 2002). The provision of social capital of partners at least might provide an explanation why having a life partner positively affects the life satisfaction of self-employed individuals (El Shoubaki and Stephan, 2018). Also, procedural utility contributes to well-being of the self-employed (Benz and Frey, 2004, 2008a,b). However, having a self-employed partner might be a burden for individuals. The results presented by Alshibani et al. (2023) and Alshibani et al. (2024) as well as Stephan et al. (2023) suggest that a self-employed

partner has effects on the spouses. Future studies might engage in more detail about the reasons whether and how having a self-employed partner affects the satisfaction of their partners. One promising predictor might be proneness to procedural governance, which likely reduces the well-being of partners. Further individual traits, such as an egoistic passion for work (Shane et al., 2003) leading to prioritizing work over the partner and the family, can affect the partner’s well-being and contribute to trouble in relationships. Also, risk attitudes might play a role in conflicts and separations (Serra-Garcia, 2022). Moreover, the analysis of crossover effects of the personality might provide additional insights. In short, we encourage further studies focusing on identifying the main factors with a negative impact on the quality of relationships or the well-being of partners and relatives.

This analysis paves the way for the study of procedural governance in other contexts. For example, the organizational processes of start-ups or scaling-up firms and running an established firm are undoubtedly different. For this reason, business dynamics play an important role and future studies might engage in analyzing procedural utility, procedural governance, business-related stressors, and tensions between partners. Moreover, one might consider self-employed with and without employees. The former are accustomed to ordering their employees how to do things and might be more dominant in their relationships than the solo self-employed. Another exciting topic is the analysis of procedural governance and tensions between two partners going into business together. Ruef et al. (2003) show that organizational founding teams frequently consist of spouses or partners. Aldrich et al. (2021) and Stamm et al. (2023) suggest that family members regularly collaborate in their family’s businesses. This is an intricate context because of ties between the work sphere (self-employment), the private sphere (relationship), and the organizational sphere (organizational issues and strategic management). In addition, in households with only one self-employed partner, private tensions might have an impact on business success, especially when entrepreneurs must focus on resolving private disputes rather than on the core business. Therefore, examining the business success and failure of entrepreneurs who are es-

pecially prone to procedural governance is promising. Furthermore, one might ask whether managers benefit from autonomously completing their own tasks or from micromanagement and "bossing" employees around, leading to a higher number of employees quitting. In finance, investors might interfere in the owners' affairs, which might lead to the withdrawal of owners. In addition, further studies might engage in analyzing gendered effects, role models, and procedural governance. Lastly, a question one may raise relates to the long-lasting effects of tensions in entrepreneurial households. For example, children may suffer from tensions between their parents and then avoid business succession or stay away from entrepreneurship throughout their lives. As a result, tensions due to the self-employment of parents might have long-lasting effects on the next generation of potential entrepreneurs and business succession.

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
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Figures included in the text



* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

+ implies that higher levels of partner's proneness to procedural governance are associated with higher levels of tensions.


Number of observations: 17,778.

Number of individuals: 6,133.

Set of control variables: logarithm of individual and household net income, the relative contribution to household income, age of respondent (in years, including squared term), the number of children living in household (main residence), and dummy variables indicating migration background, education (CASMIN scheme), duration of relationship (in months), marital status, whether at least one person living in main residence is younger than 14 years, the 16 federal states, and the survey wave.

The complete estimation results are presented in Table S.3 in the Supplementary Material.

Figure 1: Between-cluster effects of hybrid ordered probit estimation results explaining tensions



* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

+ implies that higher levels of partner's proneness to procedural governance are associated with higher levels of tensions.

Number of observations: 8,305 male respondents and 9,473 female respondents.

Number of individuals: 2,925 male respondents and 3,210 female respondents.

Set of control variables: logarithm of individual and household net income, the relative contribution to household income, age of respondent (in years, including squared term), the number of children living in household (main residence), and dummy variables indicating migration background, education (CASMIN scheme), duration of relationship (in months), marital status, whether at least one person living in main residence is younger than 14 years, the 16 federal states, and the survey wave.

The complete estimation results are presented in Table S.4 in the Supplementary Material.

Figure 2: Between-cluster effects of hybrid ordered probit estimation results explaining tensions by gender

Tables included in the text

Table 1: Pairwise correlation coefficients

	Disagree and quarrel	respondent is self-employed	partner is self-employed	Both partners are self-employed	Proneness to procedural governance
Disagree and quarrel	1.0000				
Respondent is self-employed	0.0069	1.0000			
Partner is self-employed	0.0347***	0.1493***	1.0000		
Both partners are self-employed	0.0285***	0.4552***	0.4795***	1.0000	
Proneness to procedural governance	0.2037***	0.0039	0.0428***	0.0193**	1.0000
Number of observations			17,778		
Number of individuals			6,133		

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Proneness to procedural governance refers to question "How often does your current partner make you do things his/her way?" Responses range from 1 (never) to 5 (always).

Table 2: Respondent's answers on partner dominance by partner's labor market status

How often does your current partner make you do things his/her way	Partner is...		Total
	...full-time paid employee	...self-employed	
Never	288 (1.80)	26 (1.48)	314 (1.77)
Rarely	2,972 (18.55)	245 (13.92)	3,217 (18.10)
Sometimes	8,789 (54.87)	958 (54.43)	9,747 (54.83)
Often	3,785 (23.63)	514 (29.20)	4,299 (24.18)
Always	184 (1.15)	17 (0.97)	201 (1.13)
Number of observations	16,018	1,760	17,778
Means	3.038	3.143	3.048
T-tests			
H0: partner self-employed \leq partner not self-employed: p = 0.000			
H0: partner self-employed = partner not self-employed: p = 0.000			

Column percentages (in parentheses).

Table 3: Hybrid ordered probit estimation results explaining procedural governance

How often does your current partner make you do things his/her way						
1 never						
...						
5 always						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	within-cluster effects			between-cluster effects		
	all	male	female	all	male	female
	respondents	respondents	respondents	respondents	respondents	respondents
Between-cluster effects						
Respondent is self-employed	0.039	-0.014	0.116	-0.050	-0.052	-0.039
	(0.101)	(0.143)	(0.140)	(0.071)	(0.099)	(0.102)
Partner is self-employed	0.105	-0.021	0.192	0.149**	0.095	0.194*
	(0.089)	(0.129)	(0.120)	(0.075)	(0.105)	(0.109)
Both partners are self-employed	-0.012	0.104	-0.121	0.153	0.080	0.185
	(0.153)	(0.213)	(0.210)	(0.163)	(0.226)	(0.229)
Within-cluster effects						
Set of control variables	included					
Number of observations	17,778	8,305	9,473	17,778	8,305	9,473
Number of individuals	6,133	2,925	3,210	6,133	2,925	3,210

Standard errors clustered at the individual level (in parentheses).

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Set of control variables: logarithm of individual and household net income, the relative contribution to household income, age of respondent (in years, including squared term), the number of children living in household (main residence), and dummy variables indicating migration background, education (CASMIN scheme), duration of relationship (in months), marital status, whether at least one person living in main residence is younger than 14 years, the 16 federal states, and the survey wave.

AIC stands for Akaike Information Criterion, BIC describes Schwarz's Bayesian Information Criterion.

See Table A.1 in the appendix for descriptive statistics.

Complete estimation results presented in Table S.2 in the appendix.

Table 4: Respondent's answers on partner dominance by partner's labor market status

How often does your current partner make you do things his/her way	Female respondents		Male respondents	
	Partner is...		Partner is...	
	...full-time paid employee	...self-employed	...full-time paid employee	...self-employed
Never	215 (2.50)	17 (1.91)	73 (0.98)	9 (1.03)
Rarely	2,007 (23.38)	161 (18.09)	965 (12.98)	84 (9.66)
Sometimes	4,705 (54.82)	496 (55.73)	4,084 (54.93)	462 (53.10)
Often	1,586 (18.48)	208 (23.37)	2,199 (29.58)	306 (35.17)
Always	70 (0.82)	8 (0.90)	114 (1.53)	9 (1.03)
Number of observations	8,583	890	7,435	870
Means	2.917	3.033	3.177	3.255
T-tests:				
H0: partner self-employed \leq partner not self-employed	p = 0.000		p = 0.001	
H0: partner self-employed = partner not self-employed	p = 0.000		p = 0.002	

Column percentages (in parentheses).

Appendix

Table A.1: Descriptive statistics

Variable	mean	standard deviation	minimum	maximum
Disagree and quarrel	2.4505	0.6950	1	5
Never	0.0514	0.2207	0	1
Rarely	0.5114	0.4999	0	1
Sometimes	0.3745	0.4840	0	1
Often	0.0610	0.2393	0	1
Always	0.0018	0.0424	0	1
Respondent is employee	0.8913	0.3112	0	1
Respondent is self-employed	0.1087	0.3112	0	1
Partner is paid employee	0.9010	0.2987	0	1
Partner is self-employed	0.0990	0.2987	0	1
Respondent and partner are self-employed	0.0246	0.1550	0	1
Proneness to procedural governance	3.0481	0.7324	1	5
Never	0.0177	0.1317	0	1
Rarely	0.1810	0.3850	0	1
Sometimes	0.5483	0.4977	0	1
Often	0.2418	0.4282	0	1
Always	0.0113	0.1057	0	1
Male	0.0770	0.2666	0	1
Logarithm of individual net income	7.5193	0.5124	0	11.5
Relative income of individual w.r.t. household income	0.5487	0.2100	0.0003	1.0000
Age in years	35.8826	7.4819	18	65
Age in years squared	1343.5375	549.4410	324	4,225
No migration background	0.8556	0.3515	0	1
1st generation migration background	0.0674	0.2507	0	1
2nd generation migration background	0.0770	0.2666	0	1
Inadequately completed (1a)	0.0039	0.0626	0	1
General elementary education (1b)	0.0143	0.1189	0	1

Basic vocational qualification (1c)	0.0753	0.2639	0	1
Intermediate vocational qualification (2a)	0.3475	0.4762	0	1
Intermediate general qualification (2b)	0.0130	0.1135	0	1
General maturity certificate (2c-gen)	0.0238	0.1526	0	1
Vocational maturity certificate (2c-voc)	0.1692	0.3749	0	1
Lower tertiary education (3a)	0.1128	0.3164	0	1
Higher tertiary education (3b)	0.2400	0.4271	0	1
Logarithm of household net income	8.1961	0.4449	2.5	11.2
Duration of current relationship (in months)	122.9312	92.0483	0	427
Never married	0.4261	0.4945	0	1
Married/civil union	0.5193	0.4996	0	1
Divorced/dissolved civil union	0.0530	0.2240	0	1
Widowed/surviving partner in civil union	0.0016	0.0397	0	1
Number of children living in household (main residence)	0.7446	0.9623	0	7
At least one person aged under 14 in main residence	0.3544	0.4783	0	1
Schleswig-Holstein	0.0357	0.1855	0	1
Hamburg	0.0177	0.1317	0	1
Lower Saxony	0.0939	0.2917	0	1
Bremen	0.0062	0.0788	0	1
North Rhine-Westfalia	0.1371	0.3440	0	1
Hesse	0.0699	0.2549	0	1
Rhineland-Palatinate	0.0297	0.1698	0	1
Baden-Württemberg	0.0825	0.2751	0	1
Bavaria	0.1494	0.3565	0	1
Saarland	0.0027	0.0519	0	1
Berlin	0.0429	0.2026	0	1
Brandenburg	0.0732	0.2605	0	1
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania	0.0331	0.1788	0	1
Saxony	0.1014	0.3019	0	1
Saxony-Anhalt	0.0616	0.2404	0	1
Thuringia	0.0631	0.2432	0	1
Wave 2 (2009/10)	0.0573	0.2325	0	1
Wave 3 (2010/11)	0.0475	0.2128	0	1

Wave 4 (2011/12)	0.0649	0.2464	0	1
Wave 5 (2012/13)	0.0911	0.2878	0	1
Wave 6 (2013/14)	0.0915	0.2883	0	1
Wave 7 (2014/15)	0.0813	0.2733	0	1
Wave 8 (2015/16)	0.0862	0.2806	0	1
Wave 9 (2016/17)	0.0775	0.2674	0	1
Wave 10 (2017/18)	0.0796	0.2708	0	1
Wave 11 (2018/19)	0.1156	0.3197	0	1
Wave 12 (2019/20)	0.1077	0.3100	0	1
Wave 13 (2020/21)	0.0998	0.2997	0	1
Number of observations		17,778		
Number of individuals		6,133		

Proneness to procedural governance refers to question "How often does your current partner make you do things his/her way?"

For details regarding the generation of the variables, see Table S.1.

Supplementary Material

Table S.1: Information about variables

Variable	Calculation based on: (original variables in pairfam)
Disagree and quarrel	pa17i6, ppa17i6
Disagree (various aspects)	pa21i1, pa21i2, pa21i3, pa21i4, pa21i5, pa21i6
Respondent is employee	casprim, pcasprim
Respondent is self-employed	casprim, pcasprim
Partner is paid employee	casprim, pcasprim
Partner is self-employed	casprim, pcasprim
Respondent and partner are self-employed	casprim, pcasprim
Proneness to procedural governance	pa17i3, ppa17i3
Male	sex_gen, psex_gen
Logarithm of individual net income	inc2, inc21, pinc2, pinc21
Relative income of individual w.r.t. household income	inc2, inc21, pinc2, pinc21, hhincnet
Age in years	age, page
Age in years squared	age, page
No migration background	migstatus, pmigstatus
1st generation migration background	migstatus, pmigstatus
2nd generation migration background	migstatus, pmigstatus
Inadequately completed (1a)	casmin, pcasmin
General elementary education (1b)	casmin, pcasmin
Basic vocational qualification (1c)	casmin, pcasmin
Intermediate vocational qualification (2a)	casmin, pcasmin
Intermediate general qualification (2b)	casmin, pcasmin
General maturity certificate (2c-gen)	casmin, pcasmin
Vocational maturity certificate (2c-voc)	casmin, pcasmin
Lower tertiary education (3a)	casmin, pcasmin
Higher tertiary education (3b)	casmin, pcasmin
Logarithm of household net income	hhincnet*
Duration of current relationship (in months)	reldur*

Never married	marstat, pmarstat
Married/civil union	marstat, pmarstat
Divorced/dissolved civil union	marstat, pmarstat
Widowed/surviving partner in civil union	marstat, pmarstat
Number of children living in household (main residence)	childmrd*
At least one person aged under 14 in main residence	npu14mr*
Federal state	bula*

* Information is available for one of the partners. Values have been cloned within relationships so that both partners exhibit identical values.

See Brüderl et al. (2022b) for a data description.

Estimation results: Procedural governance and self-employment

Table S.2 augments Table 3 and presents the complete estimation results. In the following, we briefly address the effects of the control variables. All interpretations are subject to the *ceteris paribus* condition.

Income-related between-cluster variables not statistically correlated with partner's proneness to procedural governance. This is largely consistent with the within-cluster effects. Only for male respondents, the within-effect of the relative income contribution to the household matters. The dummy variable for males is highly significant and positive in specification (1), which implies that males report a higher frequency of interference with their partners. With respect to age, an increasing, concave function is indicated for males. The older the respondent, the lower the increase in complaints about procedural governance of the partner, which might be explained by habituation effects. For female respondents, the effect of age is insignificant. According to the estimates, educational background of respondents seems to play a role.

Table S.2: Hybrid ordered probit estimation results explaining procedural governance

How often does your current partner make you do things his/her way			
1 never			
...			
5 always			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	all respondents	male respondents	female respondents
Within-cluster effects			
Respondent is self-employed	0.039 (0.101)	-0.014 (0.143)	0.116 (0.140)
Partner is self-employed	0.105 (0.089)	-0.021 (0.129)	0.192 (0.120)
Respondent and partner are self-employed	-0.012 (0.153)	0.104 (0.213)	-0.121 (0.210)
Logarithm of individual net income	-0.005 (0.063)	0.044 (0.099)	-0.068 (0.085)
Relative contribution to household income	-0.206 (0.165)	-0.490** (0.232)	0.126 (0.243)
Age of respondent (in years)	0.077 (0.060)	0.169 (0.112)	-0.010 (0.065)
Age of respondent (squared)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Educational background			
Inadequately completed	reference category	reference category	reference category
General elementary education	-0.815** (0.399)	-0.936*** (0.109)	-0.208 (0.932)
Basic vocational qualification	0.775 (0.506)	1.022 (0.624)	1.108 (0.857)
Intermediate vocational qualification	0.094 (0.448)	-0.185 (0.577)	0.731 (0.689)
Intermediate general qualification	0.083 (0.907)	-0.542 (0.998)	2.806*** (0.715)
General maturity certificate	0.903 (0.549)	1.166** (0.572)	0.080 (0.899)
Vocational maturity certificate	0.672* (0.403)	0.778 (0.524)	0.852 (0.631)
Lower tertiary education	0.834** (0.402)	0.872* (0.504)	0.986 (0.644)
Higher tertiary education	insufficient variation within clusters		
Household net income	-0.062 (0.077)	-0.163 (0.107)	0.077 (0.115)
Duration of relationship (in months)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Marital status			
Never married	reference category	reference category	reference category
Married/civil union	-0.114** (0.057)	-0.091 (0.084)	-0.130* (0.075)
Divorced/dissolved civil union	-0.253* (0.135)	-0.333* (0.174)	-0.166 (0.212)
Widowed/surviving partner in civil union	1.019***		0.930***

	(0.309)		(0.282)
Number of children living in household (main residence)	-0.010	0.011	-0.018
	(0.047)	(0.071)	(0.064)
At least one person living in main residence is younger than 14 years	0.088	0.047	0.134
	(0.060)	(0.091)	(0.081)
Federal state			
Schleswig-Holstein	reference	reference	reference
	category	category	category
Hamburg	-0.340	-0.337	-0.403*
	(0.241)	(0.489)	(0.244)
Niedersachsen	0.224	0.561	0.093
	(0.392)	(0.586)	(0.516)
Bremen	0.128	1.664	-1.438***
	(0.781)	(1.013)	(0.523)
Nordrhein-Westfalen	0.148	0.453	0.254
	(0.372)	(0.589)	(0.517)
Hessen	0.116	-0.299	0.498
	(0.442)	(0.664)	(0.572)
Rheinland-Pfalz	0.846*	0.466	1.440**
	(0.465)	(0.555)	(0.692)
Baden-Württemberg	0.513	0.545	0.723*
	(0.336)	(0.551)	(0.434)
Bayern	0.320	0.526	0.345
	(0.423)	(0.553)	(0.679)
Saarland	1.033	-1.731***	3.506***
	(1.794)	(0.591)	(0.542)
Berlin	0.505	1.151**	0.071
	(0.413)	(0.557)	(0.604)
Brandenburg	0.501	0.960	0.331
	(0.424)	(0.592)	(0.630)
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern		insufficient variation within clusters	0.201
			(0.380)
Sachsen	0.106	-0.333	0.554
	(0.419)	(0.715)	(0.470)
Sachsen-Anhalt	0.872	1.074	0.883
	(0.570)	(0.692)	(0.758)
Thüringen	-0.031	0.188	-0.108
	(0.428)	(0.578)	(0.611)
Wave			
2009/10	reference	reference	reference
	category	category	category
2010/11	-0.047	-0.170	0.059
	(0.077)	(0.124)	(0.096)
2011/12	0.007	-0.153	0.142
	(0.114)	(0.193)	(0.129)
2012/13	-0.134	-0.411	0.092
	(0.157)	(0.277)	(0.169)
2013/14	-0.118	-0.441	0.149
	(0.201)	(0.351)	(0.214)
2014/15	-0.246	-0.584	0.042
	(0.248)	(0.432)	(0.266)
2015/16	-0.028	-0.425	0.315
	(0.292)	(0.508)	(0.312)
2016/17	-0.226	-0.678	0.167

	(0.340)	(0.589)	(0.363)
2017/18	-0.160	-0.679	0.288
	(0.387)	(0.671)	(0.414)
2018/19	-0.310	-0.840	0.140
	(0.436)	(0.757)	(0.464)
2019/20	-0.129	-0.754	0.408
	(0.484)	(0.839)	(0.516)
2020/21	-0.233	-0.895	0.337
	(0.528)	(0.917)	(0.563)
Between-cluster effects			
Respondent is self-employed	-0.050	-0.052	-0.039
	(0.071)	(0.099)	(0.102)
Partner is self-employed	0.149**	0.095	0.194*
	(0.075)	(0.105)	(0.109)
Respondent and partner are self-employed	0.153	0.080	0.185
	(0.163)	(0.226)	(0.229)
Logarithm of individual net income	0.060	-0.031	0.086
	(0.101)	(0.178)	(0.116)
Relative contribution to household income	-0.169	-0.075	-0.181
	(0.233)	(0.359)	(0.301)
Respondent is male	0.582***		
	(0.037)		
Age of respondent (in years)	0.024	0.052*	-0.028
	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.038)
Age of respondent (squared)	-0.000	-0.001**	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Educational background			
Inadequately completed	reference	reference	reference
	category	category	category
General elementary education	-0.443	-0.957**	0.252
	(0.339)	(0.396)	(0.578)
Basic vocational qualification	-0.512*	-0.931***	0.122
	(0.308)	(0.352)	(0.541)
Intermediate vocational qualification	-0.396	-0.785**	0.206
	(0.303)	(0.345)	(0.532)
Intermediate general qualification	-0.409	-0.788**	0.185
	(0.332)	(0.373)	(0.581)
General maturity certificate	-0.041	-0.473	0.611
	(0.319)	(0.367)	(0.556)
Vocational maturity certificate	-0.220	-0.673*	0.440
	(0.304)	(0.348)	(0.533)
Lower tertiary education	-0.244	-0.693**	0.427
	(0.306)	(0.350)	(0.536)
Higher tertiary education	-0.215	-0.663*	0.451
	(0.304)	(0.347)	(0.534)
Migration background			
No migration background	reference	reference	reference
	category	category	category
1st generation	0.118	0.128	0.117
	(0.073)	(0.111)	(0.099)
2nd generation	-0.009	0.054	-0.051
	(0.065)	(0.093)	(0.089)
Household net income	0.078	0.203	0.021
	(0.116)	(0.183)	(0.150)

Duration of relationship (in months)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Marital status			
Never married	reference category	reference category	reference category
Married/civil union	0.005 (0.049)	-0.011 (0.068)	0.027 (0.071)
Divorced/dissolved civil union	0.079 (0.098)	0.046 (0.127)	0.100 (0.147)
Widowed/surviving partner in civil union	0.170 (0.394)	-0.320** (0.145)	0.187 (0.457)
Number of children living in household (main residence)	0.042 (0.037)	0.073 (0.052)	0.023 (0.052)
At least one person living in main residence is younger than 14 years	-0.043 (0.071)	-0.036 (0.099)	-0.042 (0.101)
Federal state			
Schleswig-Holstein	reference category	reference category	reference category
Hamburg	0.314** (0.152)	0.255 (0.204)	0.390* (0.227)
Niedersachsen	0.167 (0.106)	0.040 (0.143)	0.297* (0.158)
Bremen	0.464** (0.231)	0.854*** (0.302)	0.035 (0.337)
Nordrhein-Westfalen	0.260*** (0.101)	0.251* (0.135)	0.276* (0.152)
Hessen	0.229** (0.109)	0.094 (0.146)	0.358** (0.164)
Rheinland-Pfalz	0.063 (0.134)	-0.112 (0.190)	0.232 (0.190)
Baden-Württemberg	0.342*** (0.107)	0.137 (0.144)	0.527*** (0.158)
Bayern	0.313*** (0.099)	0.173 (0.134)	0.458*** (0.150)
Saarland	0.342 (0.360)	0.066 (0.373)	0.591 (0.588)
Berlin	0.233* (0.121)	0.173 (0.164)	0.282 (0.180)
Brandenburg	0.210* (0.112)	0.076 (0.151)	0.323* (0.170)
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	0.175 (0.126)	0.188 (0.173)	0.162 (0.189)
Sachsen	0.206* (0.106)	0.132 (0.140)	0.267* (0.162)
Sachsen-Anhalt	0.211* (0.119)	0.132 (0.165)	0.289* (0.175)
Thüringen	-0.139 (0.118)	-0.261* (0.156)	-0.041 (0.178)
Wave			
2009/10	reference category	reference category	reference category
2010/11	0.072 (0.155)	0.026 (0.197)	0.132 (0.242)
2011/12	0.034	-0.008	0.065

	(0.128)	(0.168)	(0.195)
2012/13	-0.083	-0.344**	0.168
	(0.117)	(0.160)	(0.171)
2013/14	-0.098	-0.057	-0.140
	(0.125)	(0.170)	(0.182)
2014/15	-0.112	-0.308	0.066
	(0.141)	(0.205)	(0.197)
2015/16	0.146	0.133	0.149
	(0.129)	(0.185)	(0.182)
2016/17	-0.228	-0.396*	-0.092
	(0.143)	(0.206)	(0.199)
2017/18	-0.038	-0.419**	0.270
	(0.131)	(0.174)	(0.195)
2018/19	-0.153	-0.315**	0.006
	(0.105)	(0.142)	(0.156)
2019/20	-0.172	-0.319**	-0.035
	(0.114)	(0.156)	(0.167)
2020/21	-0.379***	-0.410***	-0.337**
	(0.107)	(0.147)	(0.158)
Constant 1	-1.617**	-1.831**	-1.934*
	(0.695)	(0.909)	(1.128)
Constant 2	0.240	-0.087	-0.006
	(0.692)	(0.903)	(1.126)
Constant 3	2.433***	2.095**	2.212**
	(0.693)	(0.902)	(1.127)
Constant 4	4.737***	4.435***	4.454***
	(0.697)	(0.906)	(1.132)
Log pseudolikelihood	-17,489.78	-8,025.50	-9,399.98
AIC	35,183.55	16,245.00	19,001.96
BIC	35,977.69	16,926.39	19,724.73
Number of observations	17,778	8,305	9,473
Number of individuals	6,133	2,925	3,210

Standard errors clustered at the individual level (in parentheses).

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

AIC refers to Akaike Information Criterion and BIC to Bayesian Information Criterion.

Estimation results: The role of self-employment and procedural governance in conflicts between partners

Table S.3 shows the complete estimation results explaining the frequency of disagreement and quarreling when all respondents are considered. It augments Figure 1. All interpretations are subject to the *ceteris paribus* condition.

The between-cluster effects of individual net income are not significantly correlated with tensions at home. The same holds for household income and the relative contribution. Therefore, tensions between partners are, *ceteris paribus*, not significantly related to income. However, the within-cluster effects reveal some correlation with respect to individual income and the relative contribution to household income. According to the between-cluster effects, tensions become less frequent with increasing age. Tensions are the most commonly reported by individuals with basic vocational qualifications, but in general, the likelihood of tensions tends to be equally distributed across educational backgrounds. With respect to migration background, the between-cluster effects suggest that 1st generation migrants report a significantly higher frequency of tensions than individuals without migration background. Moreover, individuals with 2nd generation migration background also report higher tensions in relationships than individuals without migration background (the effect is not statistically significant in Table S.3; between-cluster effects). According to the between-cluster effects, the longer the duration of the relationship, the higher the reported frequency of disagreement and quarreling. Marital status also plays a role when it comes to tensions. While the between-cluster effect of the number of children in the household is insignificant, living with at least one person younger than 14 years increases the frequency of tensions.

Table S.3: Hybrid ordered probit estimation results explaining tensions

Disagree and quarrel				
1 never				
...				
5 always				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	B	E	B	E
Within-cluster effects				
Respondent is self-employed	0.080 (0.091)	0.076 (0.091)	0.118 (0.097)	0.113 (0.096)
Partner is self-employed	0.074 (0.094)	0.064 (0.094)	0.114 (0.104)	0.102 (0.104)
Respondent and partner are self-employed			-0.185 (0.177)	-0.180 (0.177)
How often does your current partner make you do things his/her way				
Never		reference category		
Rarely		0.481*** (0.135)		0.480*** (0.135)
Sometimes		0.620*** (0.140)		0.619*** (0.140)
Often		0.859*** (0.143)		0.858*** (0.143)
Always		1.133*** (0.213)		1.133*** (0.213)
Logarithm of individual net income	0.194*** (0.071)	0.194*** (0.071)	0.195*** (0.071)	0.195*** (0.070)
Relative contribution to household income	-0.508*** (0.181)	-0.491*** (0.181)	-0.511*** (0.181)	-0.494*** (0.180)
Age of respondent (in years)	-0.015 (0.062)	-0.024 (0.060)	-0.016 (0.062)	-0.024 (0.060)
Age of respondent (squared)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Educational background				
Inadequately completed		reference category		
General elementary education	-0.222 (0.502)	-0.096 (0.509)	-0.228 (0.501)	-0.101 (0.509)
Basic vocational qualification	0.172 (0.534)	0.145 (0.527)	0.178 (0.534)	0.151 (0.527)
Intermediate vocational qualification	0.157 (0.462)	0.183 (0.458)	0.161 (0.462)	0.188 (0.458)
Intermediate general qualification	0.217 (0.801)	0.289 (0.763)	0.217 (0.802)	0.289 (0.764)
General maturity certificate	0.846 (0.715)	0.787 (0.716)	0.845 (0.716)	0.787 (0.717)
Vocational maturity certificate	0.018 (0.392)	-0.009 (0.392)	0.019 (0.392)	-0.007 (0.393)
Lower tertiary education	0.106 (0.430)	0.064 (0.432)	0.110 (0.430)	0.068 (0.433)
Higher tertiary education	insufficient variation within clusters			
Household net income	-0.022 (0.080)	-0.014 (0.079)	-0.023 (0.080)	-0.015 (0.079)
Duration of relationship (in months)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)
Marital status				
Never married		reference category		
Married/civil union	-0.027 (0.060)	-0.020 (0.060)	-0.027 (0.060)	-0.020 (0.060)
Divorced/dissolved civil union	-0.173 (0.147)	-0.152 (0.145)	-0.171 (0.146)	-0.150 (0.145)
Widowed/surviving partner in civil union	1.982*** (0.158)	1.881*** (0.186)	1.982*** (0.158)	1.881*** (0.186)
Number of children living in household (main residence)	0.088* (0.050)	0.089* (0.049)	0.088* (0.050)	0.089* (0.049)
At least one person living in main residence is younger than 14 years	0.204*** (0.062)	0.199*** (0.062)	0.204*** (0.061)	0.199*** (0.062)
Federal state				

Schleswig-Holstein		reference category		
Hamburg	-0.292 (0.308)	-0.268 (0.304)	-0.292 (0.308)	-0.268 (0.304)
Niedersachsen	0.263 (0.375)	0.229 (0.375)	0.266 (0.375)	0.232 (0.375)
Bremen	-1.457** (0.708)	-1.467** (0.718)	-1.459** (0.707)	-1.469** (0.717)
Nordrhein-Westfalen	1.110** (0.432)	1.090** (0.432)	1.113** (0.432)	1.093** (0.432)
Hessen	0.416 (0.469)	0.392 (0.468)	0.417 (0.469)	0.393 (0.468)
Rheinland-Pfalz	1.914*** (0.550)	1.843*** (0.542)	1.914*** (0.550)	1.843*** (0.543)
Baden-Württemberg	0.995*** (0.382)	0.942** (0.383)	0.996*** (0.382)	0.943** (0.384)
Bayern	0.780* (0.455)	0.749 (0.456)	0.782* (0.455)	0.751* (0.456)
Saarland	1.486 (1.825)	1.451 (1.959)	1.490 (1.825)	1.454 (1.959)
Berlin	0.742 (0.515)	0.704 (0.511)	0.743 (0.515)	0.704 (0.511)
Brandenburg	0.866 (0.638)	0.816 (0.628)	0.867 (0.638)	0.817 (0.627)
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	insufficient variation within clusters			
Sachsen	0.695 (0.519)	0.674 (0.526)	0.688 (0.519)	0.667 (0.526)
Sachsen-Anhalt	0.907 (0.703)	0.866 (0.704)	0.897 (0.706)	0.857 (0.706)
Thüringen	0.878* (0.490)	0.898* (0.495)	0.861* (0.489)	0.882* (0.495)
Wave		reference category		
2009/10				
2010/11	-0.037 (0.081)	-0.032 (0.081)	-0.037 (0.081)	-0.032 (0.081)
2011/12	0.011 (0.120)	0.013 (0.118)	0.010 (0.120)	0.012 (0.118)
2012/13	-0.076 (0.163)	-0.064 (0.159)	-0.078 (0.163)	-0.066 (0.159)
2013/14	-0.191 (0.209)	-0.181 (0.203)	-0.194 (0.209)	-0.184 (0.204)
2014/15	-0.230 (0.257)	-0.209 (0.251)	-0.232 (0.258)	-0.211 (0.251)
2015/16	-0.135 (0.307)	-0.134 (0.298)	-0.137 (0.307)	-0.135 (0.299)
2016/17	-0.215 (0.354)	-0.197 (0.344)	-0.217 (0.354)	-0.199 (0.344)
2017/18	-0.261 (0.403)	-0.250 (0.392)	-0.263 (0.404)	-0.252 (0.392)
2018/19	-0.409 (0.453)	-0.387 (0.441)	-0.411 (0.454)	-0.390 (0.441)
2019/20	-0.292 (0.506)	-0.286 (0.492)	-0.294 (0.506)	-0.289 (0.492)
2020/21	-0.526 (0.550)	-0.510 (0.535)	-0.529 (0.550)	-0.513 (0.535)
Between-cluster effects				
Respondent is self-employed	-0.126* (0.069)	-0.118* (0.067)	-0.172** (0.079)	-0.155** (0.076)
Partner is self-employed	0.189*** (0.071)	0.131* (0.069)	0.138* (0.081)	0.091 (0.078)
Respondent and partner are self-employed			0.229 (0.176)	0.183 (0.170)
How often does your current partner make you do things his/her way				
Never		reference category		
Rarely		0.388* (0.223)		0.388* (0.223)
Sometimes		1.001*** (0.213)		1.001*** (0.213)
Often		1.725***		1.724***

		(0.217)		(0.217)
Always		2.214***		2.215***
		(0.331)		(0.331)
Male	-0.040	-0.216***	-0.040	-0.216***
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.040)
Logarithm of individual net income	-0.107	-0.126	-0.116	-0.133
	(0.121)	(0.114)	(0.122)	(0.115)
Relative contribution to household income	-0.193	-0.134	-0.169	-0.115
	(0.278)	(0.263)	(0.280)	(0.265)
Age of respondent (in years)	-0.042*	-0.048**	-0.041*	-0.048**
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Age of respondent (squared)	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Educational background				
Inadequately completed		reference category		
General elementary education	0.059	0.182	0.056	0.180
	(0.277)	(0.279)	(0.276)	(0.279)
Basic vocational qualification	0.249	0.402*	0.252	0.404*
	(0.237)	(0.244)	(0.236)	(0.243)
Intermediate vocational qualification	-0.053	0.067	-0.050	0.070
	(0.229)	(0.236)	(0.228)	(0.236)
Intermediate general qualification	0.088	0.211	0.092	0.216
	(0.269)	(0.275)	(0.268)	(0.274)
General maturity certificate	0.067	0.081	0.070	0.084
	(0.257)	(0.261)	(0.256)	(0.260)
Vocational maturity certificate	-0.042	0.025	-0.038	0.029
	(0.233)	(0.240)	(0.232)	(0.239)
Lower tertiary education	0.075	0.151	0.078	0.153
	(0.236)	(0.242)	(0.235)	(0.242)
Higher tertiary education	0.056	0.122	0.058	0.124
	(0.233)	(0.239)	(0.232)	(0.239)
Migration background				
No migration background		reference category		
1st generation	0.317***	0.287***	0.314***	0.285***
	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.081)
2nd generation	0.107	0.109	0.108	0.110
	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.068)
Household net income	0.041	0.023	0.053	0.032
	(0.142)	(0.136)	(0.143)	(0.137)
Duration of relationship (in months)	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Marital status				
Never married		reference category		
Married/civil union	-0.274***	-0.278***	-0.269***	-0.274***
	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.054)
Divorced/dissolved civil union	-0.113	-0.137	-0.112	-0.137
	(0.108)	(0.104)	(0.108)	(0.104)
Widowed/surviving partner in civil union	0.136	0.090	0.139	0.092
	(0.497)	(0.421)	(0.497)	(0.422)
Number of children living in household (main residence)	0.064	0.053	0.064	0.054
	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.039)
At least one person living in main residence is younger than 14 years	0.234***	0.244***	0.234***	0.244***
	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.077)
Federal state				
Schleswig-Holstein		reference category		
Hamburg	0.346**	0.260	0.344**	0.258
	(0.173)	(0.171)	(0.173)	(0.171)
Niedersachsen	0.075	0.030	0.077	0.032
	(0.119)	(0.114)	(0.119)	(0.114)
Bremen	0.572**	0.436*	0.567**	0.432*
	(0.242)	(0.228)	(0.242)	(0.228)
Nordrhein-Westfalen	0.221*	0.149	0.222**	0.151
	(0.113)	(0.108)	(0.113)	(0.108)
Hessen	0.175	0.108	0.179	0.111
	(0.122)	(0.117)	(0.122)	(0.117)
Rheinland-Pfalz	0.279*	0.267*	0.284**	0.271**
	(0.143)	(0.138)	(0.143)	(0.138)
Baden-Württemberg	0.141	0.042	0.144	0.043

	(0.121)	(0.116)	(0.121)	(0.115)
Bayern	0.082	-0.007	0.084	-0.005
	(0.112)	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.108)
Saarland	0.074	-0.007	0.068	-0.012
	(0.402)	(0.390)	(0.401)	(0.390)
Berlin	0.243*	0.176	0.236*	0.170
	(0.137)	(0.131)	(0.137)	(0.131)
Brandenburg	0.147	0.088	0.145	0.086
	(0.126)	(0.121)	(0.126)	(0.120)
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	0.074	0.033	0.076	0.034
	(0.148)	(0.144)	(0.148)	(0.144)
Sachsen	0.059	0.007	0.062	0.009
	(0.117)	(0.112)	(0.117)	(0.112)
Sachsen-Anhalt	0.056	-0.001	0.058	-0.000
	(0.127)	(0.121)	(0.127)	(0.121)
Thüringen	-0.223*	-0.178	-0.223*	-0.178
	(0.131)	(0.124)	(0.131)	(0.124)
Wave				
2009/10		reference category		
2010/11	0.127	0.094	0.128	0.096
	(0.173)	(0.166)	(0.173)	(0.165)
2011/12	0.047	0.036	0.050	0.038
	(0.146)	(0.142)	(0.146)	(0.142)
2012/13	0.040	0.064	0.039	0.063
	(0.133)	(0.131)	(0.133)	(0.131)
2013/14	-0.175	-0.145	-0.174	-0.144
	(0.141)	(0.140)	(0.141)	(0.140)
2014/15	-0.005	0.018	-0.008	0.016
	(0.154)	(0.149)	(0.153)	(0.149)
2015/16	-0.039	-0.097	-0.036	-0.094
	(0.142)	(0.137)	(0.142)	(0.138)
2016/17	0.017	0.081	0.017	0.080
	(0.151)	(0.149)	(0.151)	(0.149)
2017/18	-0.010	-0.001	-0.010	-0.001
	(0.153)	(0.150)	(0.153)	(0.150)
2018/19	0.185	0.228**	0.184	0.227**
	(0.114)	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.113)
2019/20	-0.259**	-0.217*	-0.258**	-0.217*
	(0.127)	(0.124)	(0.127)	(0.124)
2020/21	-0.508***	-0.406***	-0.509***	-0.407***
	(0.123)	(0.121)	(0.123)	(0.121)
Constant 1	-3.812***	-3.167***	-3.756***	-3.123***
	(0.752)	(0.757)	(0.755)	(0.761)
Constant 2	-1.043	-0.374	-0.987	-0.329
	(0.750)	(0.756)	(0.753)	(0.759)
Constant 3	1.084	1.767**	1.140	1.812**
	(0.749)	(0.756)	(0.753)	(0.760)
Constant 4	3.152***	3.858***	3.207***	3.902***
	(0.758)	(0.766)	(0.761)	(0.770)
Number of observations			17,778	
Number of individuals			6,133	
Log pseudolikelihood	-16,210.01	-15,919.64	-16,208.45	-15,918.40
AIC	32,620.01	32,055.27	32,620.90	32,056.79
BIC	33,398.58	32,896.13	33,415.04	32,913.22

Robust standard errors (in parentheses).

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

AIC refers to Akaike Information Criterion and BIC to Bayesian Information Criterion.

Table S.4 presents the complete estimation results explaining the frequency of disagreement and quarreling when male and female samples are considered. It augments Figure 2.

Table S.4: Hybrid ordered probit estimation results explaining tensions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	male respondents specifications: (1) - (4)		female respondents specifications: (5) - (8)					
	B	E	B	E	B	E	B	E
Disagree and quarrel								
1 never	0.019	0.020	0.042	0.047	0.153	0.145	0.201	0.189
...	(0.122)	(0.120)	(0.130)	(0.128)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.146)	(0.147)
5 always	0.304**	0.305**	0.328**	0.334**	-0.083	-0.096	-0.035	-0.052
	(0.140)	(0.142)	(0.151)	(0.154)	(0.123)	(0.121)	(0.139)	(0.137)
			-0.114	-0.136			-0.221	-0.202
			(0.241)	(0.238)			(0.250)	(0.250)
Within-cluster effects								
Respondent is self-employed								
Partner is self-employed								
Respondent and partner are self-employed								
How often does your current partner make you do things his/her way								
Never				reference category				
Rarely		0.753**		0.754**		0.395***		0.393***
		(0.297)		(0.297)		(0.151)		(0.151)
Sometimes		0.953***		0.954***		0.505***		0.502***
		(0.305)		(0.305)		(0.157)		(0.157)
Often		1.229***		1.231***		0.695***		0.692***
		(0.308)		(0.308)		(0.164)		(0.164)
Always		1.466***		1.468***		1.037***		1.037***
		(0.351)		(0.351)		(0.327)		(0.328)
Logarithm of individual net income		0.360***		0.348***		0.064		0.067
	(0.103)	(0.100)		(0.103)		(0.099)		(0.098)
Relative contribution to household income		-0.780***		-0.707***		-0.267		-0.273
	(0.253)	(0.249)		(0.253)		(0.270)		(0.269)
Age of respondent (in years)		0.014		-0.009		-0.073		-0.074
	(0.091)	(0.085)		(0.091)		(0.079)		(0.079)
Age of respondent (squared)		-0.001		-0.001		0.000		0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Educational background								
Inadequately completed General elementary education		-0.633***		-0.634***		0.602		0.622
	(0.105)	(0.127)		(0.105)		(0.693)		(0.693)
Basic vocational qualification		0.043		0.048		0.496		0.508
	(0.640)	(0.630)		(0.630)		(1.078)		(1.078)
Intermediate vocational qualification		0.425		0.430		-0.043		-0.042
		0.523		0.529		0.087		0.087

Intermediate general qualification	(0.617)	(0.609)	(0.617)	(0.610)	(0.652)	(0.678)	(0.651)	(0.677)
	0.085	0.238	0.086	0.239	1.238	1.012	1.236	1.010
	(0.718)	(0.667)	(0.718)	(0.668)	(2.552)	(2.563)	(2.554)	(2.565)
General maturity certificate	0.943	0.877	0.947	0.881	0.455	0.366	0.437	0.349
	(0.967)	(0.946)	(0.967)	(0.947)	(1.028)	(1.086)	(1.024)	(1.082)
Vocational maturity certificate	0.569	0.572	0.574	0.578	-0.347	-0.484	-0.355	-0.491
	(0.572)	(0.567)	(0.571)	(0.567)	(0.517)	(0.560)	(0.516)	(0.559)
Lower tertiary education	0.333	0.316	0.337	0.320	0.073	-0.068	0.075	-0.065
	(0.647)	(0.642)	(0.647)	(0.642)	(0.549)	(0.586)	(0.548)	(0.585)
Higher tertiary education	insufficient variation within clusters							
Household net income	-0.131	-0.098	-0.131	-0.098	0.091	0.078	0.088	0.075
	(0.096)	(0.093)	(0.096)	(0.093)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.132)
Duration of relationship (in months)	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.007***	0.007***	0.007***	0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Marital status	reference category							
Never married	0.016	0.028	0.015	0.027	-0.068	-0.062	-0.067	-0.061
Married/civil union	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.087)
Divorced/dissolved civil union	-0.193	-0.143	-0.194	-0.143	-0.120	-0.119	-0.114	-0.113
	(0.197)	(0.195)	(0.196)	(0.195)	(0.219)	(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.215)
Widowed/surviving partner in civil union	insufficient variation within clusters							
Number of children living in household (main residence)	0.203***	0.200***	0.203***	0.199***	0.011	-0.011	-0.011	-0.010
At least one person living in main residence is younger than 14 years	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.069)
Federal state	0.105	0.105	0.106	0.106	0.266***	0.262***	0.266***	0.261***
	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Schleswig-Holstein	0.037	0.060	0.035	0.058	-0.558	-0.528	-0.559	-0.528
Hamburg	(0.253)	(0.235)	(0.253)	(0.235)	(0.470)	(0.469)	(0.470)	(0.468)
Niedersachsen	-0.171	-0.267	-0.170	-0.265	0.304	0.289	0.308	0.293
	(0.654)	(0.655)	(0.654)	(0.655)	(0.336)	(0.329)	(0.337)	(0.330)
Bremen	-2.505**	-2.744***	-2.509**	-2.748***	-0.681*	-0.565	-0.679*	-0.563
	(1.102)	(1.056)	(1.099)	(1.053)	(0.407)	(0.408)	(0.400)	(0.400)
Nordrhein-Westfalen	0.675	0.609	0.675	0.609	0.742*	0.712*	0.748*	0.717*
	(0.697)	(0.691)	(0.697)	(0.691)	(0.413)	(0.409)	(0.415)	(0.410)
Hessen	0.187	0.236	0.184	0.233	0.268	0.205	0.271	0.208
	(0.794)	(0.823)	(0.793)	(0.822)	(0.462)	(0.462)	(0.463)	(0.462)
Rheinland-Pfalz	1.526**	1.476**	1.529**	1.479**	1.674**	1.565**	1.672**	1.564**
	(0.678)	(0.693)	(0.678)	(0.692)	(0.777)	(0.758)	(0.778)	(0.759)
Baden-Württemberg	0.395	0.311	0.397	0.314	0.965***	0.906**	0.966***	0.907**
	(0.595)	(0.604)	(0.595)	(0.604)	(0.372)	(0.374)	(0.372)	(0.374)
Bayern	0.794	0.718	0.792	0.716	0.181	0.151	0.187	0.156
	(0.694)	(0.698)	(0.694)	(0.698)	(0.529)	(0.530)	(0.530)	(0.531)
Saarland	3.729***	3.945***	3.732***	3.949***	-1.754***	-1.968***	-1.746***	-1.961***
	(0.666)	(0.667)	(0.666)	(0.667)	(0.434)	(0.431)	(0.436)	(0.433)
Berlin	0.641	0.496	0.641	0.496	0.267	0.269	0.266	0.268
	(0.832)	(0.822)	(0.832)	(0.821)	(0.693)	(0.696)	(0.693)	(0.697)
Brandenburg	0.733	0.598	0.734	0.600	0.419	0.394	0.416	0.391

Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	(1.073)	(1.052)	(0.833)	(0.831)	(0.830)	(0.838)
insufficient variation within clusters	0.397 (0.865)	0.387 (0.908)	-2.826*** (0.504)	-2.886*** (0.501)	-2.824*** (0.505)	-2.884*** (0.502)
Sachsen	(0.399)	0.387	0.637	0.604	0.631	0.599
Sachsen-Anhalt	(0.908)	(0.908)	(0.554)	(0.554)	(0.556)	(0.556)
Thüringen	0.406 (0.758)	0.250 (0.767)	0.847 (0.954)	0.834 (0.941)	0.834 (0.959)	0.827 (0.945)
Wave	1.006 (0.783)	0.990 (0.793)	0.562 (0.535)	0.599 (0.543)	0.540 (0.536)	0.578 (0.544)
2009/10		reference category				
2010/11	-0.106 (0.119)	-0.088 (0.117)	0.034 (0.110)	0.034 (0.110)	0.034 (0.110)	0.034 (0.110)
2011/12	-0.100 (0.166)	-0.083 (0.158)	0.155 (0.164)	0.154 (0.164)	0.152 (0.165)	0.151 (0.164)
2012/13	-0.139 (0.222)	-0.095 (0.209)	0.030 (0.224)	0.032 (0.223)	0.027 (0.224)	0.029 (0.223)
2013/14	-0.288 (0.276)	-0.244 (0.259)	-0.041 (0.291)	-0.039 (0.290)	-0.045 (0.291)	-0.043 (0.290)
2014/15	-0.278 (0.339)	-0.219 (0.317)	-0.094 (0.358)	-0.082 (0.356)	-0.096 (0.358)	-0.084 (0.356)
2015/16	-0.202 (0.400)	-0.162 (0.373)	0.042 (0.429)	0.038 (0.426)	0.039 (0.429)	0.034 (0.427)
2016/17	-0.314 (0.460)	-0.246 (0.429)	0.005 (0.495)	0.011 (0.492)	0.001 (0.495)	0.007 (0.493)
2017/18	-0.379 (0.523)	-0.311 (0.486)	-0.008 (0.566)	-0.009 (0.563)	-0.012 (0.566)	-0.013 (0.563)
2018/19	-0.523 (0.590)	-0.437 (0.548)	-0.140 (0.634)	-0.130 (0.630)	-0.144 (0.634)	-0.134 (0.631)
2019/20	-0.384 (0.657)	-0.306 (0.610)	-0.022 (0.708)	-0.031 (0.704)	-0.026 (0.709)	-0.034 (0.705)
2020/21	-0.643 (0.713)	-0.550 (0.663)	-0.218 (0.770)	-0.218 (0.766)	-0.222 (0.771)	-0.222 (0.766)
Between-cluster effects						
Respondent is self-employed	-0.124 (0.098)	-0.111 (0.096)	-0.166* (0.099)	-0.168* (0.096)	-0.221** (0.111)	-0.210* (0.108)
Partner is self-employed	0.175* (0.105)	0.143 (0.102)	0.218** (0.098)	0.140 (0.095)	0.150 (0.110)	0.088 (0.108)
Respondent and partner are self-employed						
How often does your current partner make you do things his/her way						
Never						
Rarely	0.566 (0.443)	0.568 (0.443)	0.337 (0.256)	0.337 (0.256)	0.337 (0.256)	0.336 (0.256)
Sometimes	1.183*** (0.427)	1.184*** (0.427)	0.956*** (0.245)	0.956*** (0.245)	0.957*** (0.245)	0.957*** (0.245)
Often	1.866*** (0.430)	1.867*** (0.430)	1.723*** (0.253)	1.723*** (0.253)	1.721*** (0.253)	1.721*** (0.253)
Always	2.510***	2.514***	2.036***	2.036***	2.033***	2.033***

Logarithm of individual net income	-0.334* (0.180)	-0.325* (0.174)	-0.337* (0.179)	-0.328* (0.173)	0.035 (0.151)	0.004 (0.146)	0.022 (0.153)	(0.486) -0.007 (0.148)
Relative contribution to household income	0.438 (0.383)	0.469 (0.369)	0.451 (0.383)	0.481 (0.366)	-0.692* (0.378)	-0.621* (0.383)	-0.661* (0.370)	-0.597 (0.370)
Age of respondent (in years)	-0.024 (0.033)	-0.039 (0.032)	-0.023 (0.033)	-0.039 (0.032)	-0.089** (0.042)	-0.080** (0.040)	-0.087** (0.042)	-0.079** (0.040)
Age of respondent (squared)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001** (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)
Educational background								
Inadequately completed	0.097 (0.352)	0.360 (0.323)	0.097 (0.351)	0.360 (0.322)	reference category	-0.111 (0.483)	-0.063 (0.522)	-0.118 (0.522)
General elementary education	0.386 (0.263)	0.653*** (0.242)	0.388 (0.261)	0.656*** (0.241)	0.083 (0.457)	0.074 (0.500)	0.083 (0.456)	0.074 (0.499)
Basic vocational qualification	0.133 (0.254)	0.353 (0.231)	0.137 (0.251)	0.357 (0.230)	-0.285 (0.445)	-0.309 (0.491)	-0.285 (0.444)	-0.309 (0.490)
Intermediate vocational qualification	0.208 (0.313)	0.433 (0.299)	0.210 (0.311)	0.435 (0.298)	-0.036 (0.495)	-0.061 (0.532)	-0.030 (0.494)	-0.056 (0.532)
Intermediate general qualification	0.202 (0.295)	0.330 (0.271)	0.207 (0.293)	0.334 (0.270)	-0.079 (0.478)	-0.233 (0.521)	-0.080 (0.477)	-0.234 (0.520)
General maturity certificate	0.099 (0.261)	0.285 (0.239)	0.103 (0.259)	0.289 (0.238)	-0.237 (0.448)	-0.332 (0.494)	-0.236 (0.447)	-0.332 (0.493)
Vocational maturity certificate	0.367 (0.264)	0.559** (0.242)	0.369 (0.262)	0.561** (0.241)	-0.250 (0.452)	-0.339 (0.497)	-0.251 (0.451)	-0.340 (0.496)
Lower tertiary education	0.173 (0.259)	0.354 (0.236)	0.177 (0.257)	0.358 (0.235)	-0.101 (0.450)	-0.198 (0.496)	-0.103 (0.449)	-0.200 (0.495)
Higher tertiary education								
Migration background								
No migration background	0.318*** (0.121)	0.290** (0.120)	0.313*** (0.121)	0.285** (0.120)	reference category	0.288*** (0.109)	0.325*** (0.111)	0.287*** (0.109)
1st generation	0.173* (0.100)	0.159* (0.097)	0.172* (0.100)	0.159* (0.096)	0.053 (0.099)	0.064 (0.095)	0.056 (0.098)	0.066 (0.095)
2nd generation	0.303 (0.193)	0.245 (0.189)	0.309 (0.193)	0.250 (0.189)	-0.144 (0.193)	-0.143 (0.189)	-0.129 (0.195)	-0.131 (0.192)
Household net income	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Duration of relationship (in months)								
Marital status								
Never married	-0.325*** (0.080)	-0.323*** (0.079)	-0.321*** (0.080)	-0.320*** (0.079)	reference category	-0.245*** (0.077)	-0.228*** (0.078)	-0.241*** (0.077)
Married/civil union	0.041 (0.143)	0.030 (0.140)	0.040 (0.143)	0.029 (0.140)	0.078 (0.161)	-0.333** (0.152)	-0.302* (0.161)	-0.332** (0.152)
Divorced/dissolved civil union	-0.327** (0.164)	-0.235 (0.162)	-0.329** (0.164)	-0.237 (0.163)	0.142 (0.565)	0.091 (0.484)	0.146 (0.566)	0.094 (0.485)
Widowed/surviving partner in civil union	0.087 (0.059)	0.068 (0.058)	0.086 (0.059)	0.067 (0.058)	0.048 (0.055)	0.044 (0.054)	0.049 (0.055)	0.045 (0.054)
Number of children living in household (main residence)	0.227** (0.114)	0.234** (0.111)	0.228** (0.114)	0.235** (0.111)	0.253** (0.110)	0.263** (0.107)	0.252** (0.110)	0.262** (0.107)
At least one person living in main residence is younger than 14 years								

2018/19	(0.208)	(0.205)	(0.207)	(0.205)	(0.225)	(0.219)	(0.225)	(0.219)
	0.003	0.097	0.001	0.095	0.386**	0.376**	0.387**	0.377**
	(0.156)	(0.155)	(0.156)	(0.155)	(0.167)	(0.165)	(0.167)	(0.165)
2019/20	-0.355**	-0.270	-0.355**	-0.271	-0.161	-0.157	-0.161	-0.157
	(0.175)	(0.173)	(0.175)	(0.173)	(0.185)	(0.179)	(0.185)	(0.179)
2020/21	-0.626**	-0.515***	-0.629***	-0.518***	-0.379**	-0.289*	-0.378**	-0.287*
	(0.175)	(0.172)	(0.175)	(0.172)	(0.174)	(0.171)	(0.174)	(0.171)
Constant 1	-2.717***	-1.847*	-2.675***	-1.807**	-5.198***	-4.488***	-5.129***	-4.436***
	(1.003)	(1.040)	(1.006)	(1.043)	(1.193)	(1.199)	(1.198)	(1.204)
Constant 2	0.078	0.983	0.120	1.023	-2.429**	-1.700	-2.360**	-1.649
	(1.001)	(1.039)	(1.003)	(1.042)	(1.188)	(1.196)	(1.194)	(1.202)
Constant 3	2.174**	3.099***	2.216**	3.140***	-0.260	0.478	-0.190	0.530
	(1.000)	(1.040)	(1.003)	(1.043)	(1.188)	(1.196)	(1.194)	(1.202)
Constant 4	4.055***	5.005***	4.096***	5.044***	1.998*	2.757**	2.067*	2.808**
	(1.009)	(1.056)	(1.012)	(1.059)	(1.203)	(1.210)	(1.209)	(1.216)
Number of observations		8,305		9,473				
Number of individuals		2,925		3,210				
Log_pseudolikelihood	-7,517.47	-7,370.41	-7,517.07	-7,369.99	-8,631.09	-8,484.18	-8,629.91	-8,483.33
AIC	15,224.94	14,946.82	15,228.14	14,949.98	17,460.18	17,182.36	17,461.82	17,184.66
BIC	15,892.28	15,670.35	15,909.53	15,687.56	18,168.64	17,948.07	18,184.60	17,964.68

Robust standard errors (in parentheses).

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

AIC refers to Akaike Information Criterion and BIC to Bayesian Information Criterion.

Table S.5 presents the central estimation results regarding a model with gendered interaction terms of partner's self-employment and partner's proneness to procedural governance. Only the main coefficients are shown. The complete estimation results are available upon request.

Table S.5: Hybrid ordered probit estimation results analyzing gender-sensitivity

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		(7)		(8)	
	B	E	B	E	B	E	B	E	B	E	B	E	B	E	B	E
Disagree and quarrel																
1 never																
...																
5 always																
Partner is self-employed	-0.071	-0.085	-0.031	-0.045	0.208**	0.127	0.150	0.079	between-cluster effects							
Interaction: male X partner is self-employed	0.377**	0.392**	0.376**	0.391**	-0.038	0.010	-0.022	0.023								
How often does your current partner make you do things his/her way																
Never		reference		reference		reference		reference		reference		reference		reference		reference
Rarely		category		category		category		category		category		category		category		category
Sometimes		0.391***		0.389***		0.318		0.317		0.936***		0.935***		0.935***		0.935***
Often		0.504***		0.502***		1.696***		1.693***		1.696***		1.693***		1.693***		1.693***
Always		0.690***		0.688***		1.968***		1.965***		1.968***		1.965***		1.965***		1.965***
Interaction: male X How often does your current partner make you do things his/her way																
Never		reference		reference		reference		reference		reference		reference		reference		reference
Rarely		category		category		category		category		category		category		category		category
Sometimes		0.364		0.367		0.248		0.254		0.231		0.234		0.234		0.234
Often		0.444		0.448		0.167		0.173		0.167		0.173		0.173		0.173

Always	0.464	included	0.466	included	0.537	included	0.545	included
Both partners are self-employed								
Set of control variables		included		included				
Number of observations								17,778
Number of individuals								6,133

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

Set of control variables: logarithm of individual and household net income, the relative contribution to household income, age of respondent (in years, including squared term), the number of children living in household (main residence), and dummy variables indicating migration background, education (CASMIN scheme), duration of relationship (in months), marital status, whether at least one person living in main residence is younger than 14 years, the 16 federal states, and the survey wave.