This paper analyses the new legal form of the "Gesellschaft mit gebundenem Vermögen" planned in the coalition agreement. It shows that the core elements of the legal form (asset lock as well as the retention of company shares in the so-called "capabilities and values family") could endanger rather than promote the continued existence of companies in the long term. This is because the lack of profit participation and the requirement to belong to the so-called "fami-ly of values" make searching for suitable successors more difficult. The legal form also seems less suitable for newly founded companies and start-ups. On the one hand, the formation costs for the “GmbH-gebV” are higher than for other legal forms (e.g. partnerships). On the other hand, the legal form complicates the access to venture capital and could, in the worst case, limit the growth potential of start-ups.
Denkpapiere | 2023 “Gesellschaft mit gebundenen Vermögen” – A critical view of the legal form from an economic perspective
Kay, R.; Schlömer-Laufen, N.; Reiff, A. (2023). Gesellschaft mit gebundenen Vermögen – eine kritische Betrachtung aus ökonomischer Sicht, IfM Bonn: Denkpapier, Bonn.